Thursday, December 10, 2015

THE FRAGILITY OF OUR BOOM

FROM BUSINESS WORLD OF 26 JUNE 2006


The trade cycle – what next?


There is considerable demand in Europe for India’s success story; I have given talks on it in Paris, Berlin and Ljubljana in the past week. After one of them, a listener said that he understood India was experiencing a sustained boom like the one Germany enjoyed for three decades after World War II, which transformed it from a shattered economy to one of the richest in the world; where, he asked, will the boom take India?
I did not have the heart to tell him, but India’s boom differs from those experienced by Germany and Japan after the War in a crucial respect. Throughout their booms, these two defeated countries enjoyed a current account surplus. There was, therefore, no external economic threat to their growth. India’s current account was briefly in surplus between 1999 and 2004, but turned deficit soon after. Hence India’s boom faced external vulnerability. In fact, I predicted a number of times last year that the Indian economy would reach a turning point by 2007 at the latest. That turning point came earlier than I had thought, namely in the form of the stock market meltdown in May.
Those in power did not share my diagnosis; they believed that because they were sitting on $150 billion of foreign exchange reserves, they could cope with any external crisis. For them, the break in Sensex is a trivial event. Indian politicians invest their ill-gotten gains in property, while bureaucrats invest them in real estate and government bonds. So for them, shares are a plaything of shady stockbrokers. If a Ketan Parekh loses his fortune, a Harshad Mehta his life, that is rough justice.
But because of something those in power did 15 years ago, the stock market has become a plaything of foreign investors, and their reading of where it is headed has an impact on the balance of payments. A good deal of their money has flown out in the past two months, and more may.
They brought in foreign exchange, and they are now taking it away. But shares are bought and sold in Rupees. Hence the inflows and outflows of foreign exchange must be reflected in money supply. If they sell off shares, domestic money supply must shrink.
That would cause immediate discomfort to the banks, whose cash reserves must contract; with it declines their capacity to lend, and their revenue growth. That would worry their mother, Reserve Bank.
Reserve Bank could easily restore their cash balances by buying off some government securities from them. But money supply also affects market rates of interest; the more liberal Reserve Bank is with it, the lower the interest rates – and the more attractive investing abroad becomes. If domestic interest rates are low enough, not only foreign investors but also Indian companies, traders and speculators would take money out and invest it abroad. That would contract money supply, and Reserve Bank would have to buy even more securities to replenish it.
And at a time when their capacity to lend is threatened, banks do not like low interest rates, for interest for them is income. And if they do not like low interest rates, Their mother, Reserve Bank, cannot like them either.
Hence once the stock market boom broke, it was inevitable that interest rates must go up. Another reason is just appearing on the horizon, namely inflation. India has had a relatively benign inflation climate for ten years. But now, the supply-demand balance in foodgrains is turning adverse, and so is it internationally in oil. And as inflation rises, so must nominal interest rates.
As they rise, investment in sectors that depend on borrowing must come down. Property is the most obvious one, but not the only one. The downturn in investment takes time to show, for investment plans cannot be revised or abandoned overnight. First come sleepless nights for builders, lenders and investors; then, only after much biting of nails, when they can no longer find any more money, do they start cutting down investment.

But that too will come. The Indian economy is not the Chinese; the Indian boom is not an export-led boom. So it must turn down, if not this year, then next. Which is a pity, because with slightly better, somewhat more export-friendly economic policy, we could have gone on growing for many a year.