General Musharraf, the Delhi-born commander-in-chief and president of Pakistan, was an enterprising man. He tried to resolve Pakistan's problems with India. He came to Agra in July 2001 without any result. This column was written in Business Standard of 9 October 2001.
WHY MINISTER?
I know just how inept BJP’s economic policy is, what
a mess it has made of the economy, and how much more damage it will do in the
years to come. By comparison, I have far more respect for its foreign policy.
It has explored new frontiers, sought new alignments, and tried to remove the
misfit between our foreign policy stance and national interest that had emerged
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. I do not think Jaswant Singh should
have been so exclusively focussed on the US and so rude to Japan; and the
government’s policy towards neighbours has been somewhere between fitful and
slapdash. But these matters of detail aside, Jaswant Singh’s tango with
foreigners has provided a better spectacle than Yashwant Sinha’s Bharat Natyam
with assorted moneybags.
That is why the behaviour of our leaders since
Musharraf’s arrival in Agra has puzzled me. Leaders, because Jaswant Singh is
no longer the only actor; the Prime Minister and the home minister have jumped
on to the dance floor with a thud. First, the theatricals. The PM staying in a
swadeshi hotel, the Pakistani President in a foreign one. One visiting the
other accompanied by family. More like a match party (I mean a match between
aspiring bride and groom, not a cricket match). The only reason I could find
for this pomp was that the PM likes good hotels.
Then came Musharraf’s breakfast with Indian editors
– or rather, his address to the Indian people over their heads. To me he seemed
to be saying: give me a road map to the solution of the Kashmir problem, and I
will agree on everything else with you – trade, investment, etc etc. He did not
define a solution; he did not say, give me Kashmir, or let Kashmiris decide
where they want to belong. He said, you define a solution and tell me how we
can get there.
His TV breakfast caused consternation in the Indian
official community. Our politicians and bureaucrats thought that Musharraf had
broken some protocol by talking in public about things being discussed behind
closed doors. Maybe he did. In difficult negotiations like these, both sides
generally agree on some rules in advance. Maybe they had agreed not to talk to
the press before a certain time. Even if they did not, Musharraf’s was a breach
of etiquette.
But that is not why he caused such outrage. The
indignation of the Indian official community arose from the message itself, not
its time or place. For what is its road map to a solution? It is: convert the
line of control into an international border. Let us keep what we have, you
keep what you have. If our leaders had said that, Musharraf would have flown
back even faster. That is why Vajpayee never says it: because that would put an
end to all negotiations. But that is our answer, is it not? If it is, I simply
do not understand why our leaders bother – I mean, bothered, for Musharraf will
not talk to them any time soon. From his point of view, they were not serious;
from their point of view, he was not desperate enough.
Then comes Black Tuesday. Shocking acts of terror;
five Indians died, together with 5000 others. There was widespread sympathy for
the Americans, and the Prime Minister was obviously right to express it. There
were arguments for and against offering help unasked; but the reason is obvious
– maybe the US could be persuaded to work against all terrorists, not only anti-American
ones. But why publicly? Why trumpet it? Why not just tell Ambassador Blackwill
quietly what information we have that might be useful to the Americans, and
offer to share it? Or even offer airports? Why must the Prime Minister make a
phone call to President Bush? Why send Brajesh Mishra to the doorsteps of US
officials? Agree as I do with the government’s aims, the means adopted
completely escape my understanding.
The moment when General Colin Powell asked Pakistan
which side it was on was dramatic; it was good spectacle the way General
Musharraf writhed and wriggled. But he made up his mind quickly and clearly;
from that moment on it was clear that the equations had changed. Pakistan had
suddenly raised its value to the US. It was not our fault; it was just fate.
One has to take such reverses in one’s stride. Instead of which our leaders
burst into public paroxysms of hurt pride, indignation and wishful thinking.
They dreamt of a democratic alliance against terrorism that would include US
and – you have to believe it! – China. They kept offering facilities to the US
which no longer wanted them. Pakistanis must have enjoyed their discomfiture as
much as we did Musharraf’s. Then came the attack on the Kashmir assembly. A
little girl dead without knowing why. A bleeding man propping himself up in the
street. It is desperately sad. It is intolerable. But should the PM have told
Bush that our patience was running out? One should never utter a threat unless
one is in a position to carry it out.
In 1970, as refugees streamed across the border from
East Pakistan, Mrs Gandhi said publicly, repeatedly, that India’s would not
tolerate the situation. She went to Washington and delivered the message to an
unsympathetic President Nixon. She went on doing it for six months; and in the
meanwhile she asked General Maneckshaw to prepare for war and gave him whatever
weapons he asked for. Then, in a swift three-week campaign he made good her
word. But why did she warn everyone? So that other countries would not be taken
by surprise and do something incalculable; and so that she could gauge their
reactions and hold the international variables constant while she carried out
her subcontinental military strategy.
That is leadership.. I do not expect our leaders to
make public speeches about how they are going to settle Pakistan’s goose; I do
not even want to know how they are going
to deal with Pakistan. But I wish they would stop talking and start doing
something. Or at least stop talking so much, so pointlessly.
And if they are looking for something decisive to
do, they should look at the last ten years’ history. In these ten years, the
west’s perception of India and Pakistan changed diametrically. From a sickly
child of the Soviet Union, India came to be regarded as a potential tiger; from
a reliable friend, Pakistan came to be seen as a rogue state. Why? Because
India overcame a payments crisis and came to grow at 6 per cent, while Pakistan
sank deeper and deeper. Economic growth is what makes a difference to a
country’s international weight in the long run; that is why the harm the BJP
leaders have done to India’s economic performance is far more treasonable than
their speeches on foreign policy are patriotic.
