Wednesday, February 25, 2015

HOW TO DEAL WITH CLIQUES

[As I read management literature in Stanford, I also reflected on my stint in the ministry of finance in the early 1990s, which I had entered with high ideals and flying ambition and left in sadness after being thwarted by one of the minister's favourites. This column was published in Business Standard of 12 July 2000.]

Ambiguity and delinquency


Anyone who has worked in a large company is aware of the distance between formal hierarchy and rules on the other hand and working relations and practices on the other. The distance exhibits itself in the prevalence of cliques – informal groups of mutually obliging people. They help their members achieve goals, which may be those of the organization but often are not. Insofar as they are not, clique members hide the fact. In other words, the rules that are actually practised are different, often very different from the formal rules. The deviation sometimes helps achieve the goals of the organization, but sometimes makes it easier for the clique members to cope with pressures put on them by the organization. Not everyone can belong to a clique; nor can the entire company function as a clique. The rules of cooperation and mutual help apply only within the cliques. Between them there is warfare, generally covert, but which can break out in the open.
Almost invariably, the staff employees – that is, the experts and advisers – are kept out of the line employees’ cliques; the latter work almost systematically to ensure that the former fail. This endemic conflict can be a perpetual source of frustration to the top management. It relies on staff to maintain standards and improve working methods; it sees the work of the staff as being sabotaged by the line employees. The frustrations make staff jobs less attractive than line jobs, and build inertia into the organization.
Conversely, managers and workers’ representatives are by definition in an adversarial relationship and must keep up an appearance of hostility, or distance at any rate. And yet, each will want things out of the other; cooperation and give-and-take arise between the two which often lead in time to the formation of cliques across hierarchies.
More generally, wherever people need the cooperation of others over whom they do not have authority, they will tend to use other weapons – give-and-take, social ties, go-betweens – which in time tie them together in cliques. Thus at any point of time, there is a covert organization chart which can often look very different from the formal one.
The cliques subsist on the mutual exchange of rewards and on the visitation of punishments on those outside. Many of these can be legal and proper – for instance, opportunities to travel. Some might be improper but legal; for instance, bigger daily allowances than required. But many are improper and illegal – for instance, opportunities to collect commissions and bribes. Where the latter are used as rewards, a conflict arises between the efficient functioning of the organization and its viability.
Amongst the rewards and punishments, the most important are promotion and sidelining. Hence if the cliques have full sway, it will happen that the most efficient manipulators of the most powerful cliques will end up at the top, and that ability or merit will cease to be a criterion in promotion. When an organization riddled with favouritism faces competition or need for change, it will break out into wrangling, and fail to meet external challenges.
Melville Dalton described this picture forty years ago in his Men Who Manage. Many Indian managers will recognize it. Everywhere, the chief tends to select and reward people who agree with him and do his bidding. What he looks for is managers in his own image. What he gets is managers who appear to do his bidding, but are actually clique leaders good at both getting things done and sabotaging them. They shape what actually happens, while giving him the feeling that he is shaping them.
And many people in the government will recognize that this is more or less how it works. When a set of politicians with an agenda of its own – for instance, the BJP or Shiv Sena – takes over, it finds itself stymied by the existing cliques. They get rid of the current secretaries, and instead put in cronies. Sometimes they get cronies without cliques, who prove ineffective. Often they get cronies who are clique leaders, and who get things done for their political masters, but also for their cliques – for instance, capture posts like Customs Commissioners of Bombay and Delhi.
The remarkable thing is that if the organization inducts a “reformer” to revamp it, he will find himself strongly tempted to take the organization as given. He has limited freedom to change the people he has to work with. So he takes them for what they are, and uses what powers he has of reward and punishment to get performance out of them. If he stays long enough, he develops his own clique or cliques.
Is that the only way? Can the reforming executive be no more than a chameleon, changing his colours to suit the organization? I think the answer is that the effectiveness of the organization can be changed only by changing the geography of its cliques. So the first thing he has to do is to understand that map. It will nowhere be delineated; people will make greatest efforts to conceal it. But it must be uncovered step by step – by meeting employees, by bringing them together and observing their chemistry, by inducting individual rewards and punishments and observing their ripples.

Once he has got the geography right, the options open to the executive will follow. They are basically of three sorts. One is to reward the cliques that serve his purpose and punish those that do not. Another is to reshape the cliques – by moving people, changing their functions and powers, reorganizing departments. And the third and the most effective means is to introduce pressures on the cliques that are goal-oriented. Just which of the three the executive should do will depend on how long he expects to last and what his powers are. But generally speaking, he will need to do all three if he wants to maximize his impact.

WORLD PRACTICES IN CORPORATE TRAINING

[I first interviewed Indian company executives in the late sixties in the course of my early studies on industrial technology. In Stanford I extended my knowledge to management across the world. This column was published in Business Standard of 3 July 2000.]


Managers: the make-or-buy decision


I was once visiting the India International Trade Fair, where I met a German executive. He asked me why we did not allow his company to set up a subsidiary (this was before the reforms). I asked him what difference it would make, since his company was in a joint venture with an Indian company already. He picked up an engineering product – I think it was a valve. He said, “Ask one of your workers to disassemble this product and reassemble it to make it work. He would not be able to, while one of our workers would. Our workers serve a five-year apprenticeship. At its end a worker is given a lump of stainless steel, and is required to make a perfect cube from it. That is the kind of training we give our workers; we would train Indian workers too in the same way if we were given freedom to organize our business the way we like.”
The point is that the Germans instil a lot of training into their workers before they induct them. Most skilled workers would undergo five years’ apprenticeship in a technical school. All graduates would do a four-year degree. Many would go on to do a minor doctorate that might take three-four years. This way they create workers who are highly skilled and versatile before they take them; their proven ability takes them smoothly upwards.
The Japanese pattern is slightly different. There they take workers at an early age; then they train the workers and managers within the firm. But the training is as rigorous as in German technical schools. The worker is sent from one department to another. In each he is assigned to a senior worker, who acts as his teacher. There he is expected to achieve perfection in the job; then he is sent to another job. The jobs themselves are broadly defined; at a single workstation a worker may be handling half a dozen machines at the same time. In his first few years the worker achieves precision and versatility, and thus becomes qualified for promotion into the ranks of teacher-managers. Again, a meritocracy is created from which the upper management emerges.
In the French system, the workers do not necessarily get prior occupational training; many are recruited straight into jobs after leaving general or specialist schools. After that they are promoted according to ability. But managers are separately recruited, usually from universities, and the best from the écoles supérieures, where they are given a rigorous professional training. Workers seldom make it into the higher ranks. Within the corps of managers, promotion is a combination of merit and collegiality.
The British system is still less structured. Not only are workers recruited from a broad field without any necessary level of prior training, but managers are equally broadly recruited without professional training. The interview is the prime instrument of recruitment as well as of promotion; what counts is an informal assessment of quality by peers, not training.
The American system was the same, but has undergone major changes in recent decades. First came the divisionalization of American management. Departmental structures were replaced by divisions within a company, each of which was designed to be a profit centre. In other words, financial responsibility has been pushed ever further downwards in American companies. As a result, many more managers get responsibility and have a chance to prove themselves at a relatively early age; their performance is used to promote them to higher positions. Second and more recently, the output of MBAs from American universities and business schools has expanded enormously. All these MBAs do not go into industry; a high proportion goes into finance and consulting. Still, the American industry inducts a large number of starting managers who have a broad training in various areas such as finance, marketing, personnel and strategy.
The Indian system has been close to the British. The government started many Indian Technology Institutes – centers of basic mechanical training – with help from Germany and other countries. Still, most industrial workers come with no prior training. They can hope to rise to foremen. But managers are recruited separately out of the elite. The IIMs provided a small part of the managers; in the 1990s they have been supplemented by trainees of other new management schools. But by and large, managers too come untrained into a company. After that, promotion follows periodic assessments, partly meritocratic and partly political.
But there is a difference between the best companies and the others. The best rotate managers – not workers – through their various factories, departments, and functions; that way they both raise the quality of the managers and form a solid view of their ability over time, and use it for promotions. In other words, although recruitment into the ranks of managers is still haphazard, their movement upwards is meritocratic. In the worst companies, the promotions are also political. The practices of a company become immediately apparent when one goes into a meeting with the managers of a company. The managers of a well managed company will all speak, and will have views of their own; they will be obviously used to functioning on their own, and coordination amongst them will be collegial. In the poor companies, the managers will sit silent, often behind or away from the Big Boss; they will be focused on him, and follow his every word. They are not managers, but flunkeys; they do not magnify his power, but only personify it.

Indian companies that want to become competitive will, above all, have to change the way they recruit and train workers. Their productivity is abysmal, and since the companies are stuck with the workers once recruited, it is in their interest to invest in the ability of workers. But they will not be able to produce better workers unless they can train better managers – more confident, more hands-on, more secure.

AMERICA'S BEST PAID CEOS

[I was fascinated by the workings of American capitalism. This column from Business Standard of 19 June 2000 is about the pay of chief executive officers.]


America’s richest CEOs


When an Indian manager thinks of a CEO’s position, he thinks first of the perks, and then of his salary. Now he may also give a thought to stock options if he is in software. The horizons of the American manager are broader. Perks are, of course, substantial; they may, for example, cover free holidays for him and his wife, personal use of the corporate jet, moving expenses, multiple dwellings, etc. But apart from salary and perks, there are substantial bonuses, depending on the company’s performance; they may be simply a percentage of the year’s profits, but can depend in complicated ways on long-term performance. Increasingly, companies are engaging CEOs who agree to specific improvements in corporate performance over a number of years.
But the most popular form of performance pay is stock options – a promise to sell to the CEO a certain number of the company’s shares at a predetermined price. The more the market price goes up, the higher the value to the CEO of the stock options. They build in a direct incentive to raise the market price of the company’s shares.
Thus it happens to Jack Welch, the CEO of General Electric, is the highest paid CEO. In 1999 he got a salary of $3.3 million, a bonus of $10 million, and other incentive payments of $31.3 million – a total of $44.7 million. But he was by no means the richest CEO. Bill Gates, the CEO of Microsoft (a post he has since yielded to Steve Ballmer) got a salary of a mere $400,000, and a bonus of $223,000. But the value of his accumulated equity and options was $70 billion, far dwarfing Jack Welch’s $105 million.
These two men typify the rift emerging between the old and the new economies. In the old economy, the stock market places a low value upon the company; so to attract good CEOs, it has to pay a high annual income. In the new economy, stock appreciation is high, and the CEO is paid a high proportion of his income in options. Thus after Jack Welch, the highest annual compensation is that of William Wise of El Paso Energy. This well run electric utility is virtually a pariah in the stock market; so of his $105 million of wealth, $71 million is actual shares. Whereas the wealthiest man after Bill Gates is Larry Ellison of Oracle ($8.4 billion), and the next richest is Henry T Nicholas III of Broadcom ($4.8 billion); almost all their assets consist of options. The New York Times collected the financial details of 100 CEOs of old-economy companies and 60 new-economy companies. The average pay of the former was $3.5 million; of the latter, $911,000. But the average assets – own-company shareholdings and options – of the former were $78 million; of the latter, $1.9 billion.
Someone of CEO calibre would be in his 40s and would have been in the corporate game for 20 years at least. He would have enough money to retire – or at least to live well for a few years. He does not need big pay; he is in a position to take a gamble. So old-economy managers are vulnerable to the lure of the new economy; and an increasing number are taking the plunge,leaving old-economy companies to head new-economy ones, taking a big drop in pay but earning options. Last June, Joseph Galli left as CEO of Black and Decker, the company that makes wonderful motorized hand tools, to head Amazon.com; he got options on 2 million shares. Daniel H Schulman left AT&T in August to head Priceline.com. At lower levels, defections are common.
Old-economy companies have to pay their executives more to retain them, but hardly with options, for their share prices have been falling for the last year. None’s so fast as that of Philip Morris, the cigarette maker Its CEO, Geoffrey Bible, had $94 million’s worth of options at the beginning of 1999. Over the year, its share price fell 56 per cent; and the value of his options fell to less than $1 million.
So old economy companies that offer options are having to offer a lifeline – that if the price of their shares falls below a threshold, they would buy them back from the CEOs at the limit price. Others give their CEOs restricted stock – they give the shares free if the CEO stays with them for a minimum number of years. Yet others relate pay to other indicators of performance – usually profits.
Still, the volume of outstanding options is so large that it hangs like a cloud over the stock market. Stock options, restricted options and such employee share entitlements were 7 per cent of all outstanding shares in 1989; ten years later, their share had gone up to almost 14 per cent. Company shareholders had something to worry about: if those options were cashed, there would be considerable dilution of equity, and chances of share appreciation would be greatly reduced. This is why options are not the preferred choice of corporate activists. These are shareholders’ advocates who seek to make companies more accountable to shareholders and to increase shareholder rewards. They want CEOs and other managers actually to hold shares of the companies they manage, and thus to reduce the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. So it happens that for the sake of reputation or as a result of shareholder pressure or by exercise of options, American CEOs come to have substantial shareholdings.

What happens when share prices fall? Companies become attractive buys. Their CEOs or promoters buy the shares in the market and obtain control over the company. And since company buybacks are allowed in America, many of them borrow to buy their own shares – taking the company private, as it is called. There are “promoters” in the US as there are in India; and whenever the stock market goes down, publicly held companies are taken private and go under promoters’ control.

INDIA TWO CENTURIES AGO

[One of my greatest pleasures in Stanford was unearthing the treasures of its libraries and reading them; Major Archer's travelogues was on of them. This column was published in Business Standard of 5 June 2000.]

Major Archer’s Travels in Upper India


In 1827, Lord Combermere came to India as Commander-in-Chief of the British forces. His Aide-de-camp, Major Archer, wrote a travelogue, which was published in London in two volumes in 1833, under the title Tours in Upper India, and in Parts of the Himalaya Mountains; with Accounts of the Courts of the Native Princes, &c. They made their perambulations 70 years after Clive subjugated Bengal, 34 years after the British displaced the French in south India and nine years after they finally defeated the Marathas at Paniput and became the paramount power in India. In the course of these conquests the East India Company removed those rulers that had fought against it and annexed their territory. Of those who had not, some like the Mogul Emperor were given annual pensions and deprived of their territorial rights, while others were allowed to continue in their reign. Thus, the patchwork of red and yellow that lasted till 1947 had already emerged in its outlines by 1827.
Those who were allowed to rule a territory had some elasticity in their revenues. By good management they could raise revenue; by oppression they could reduce it. The taxpayer was the peasant; he worked for everyone else. If someone did not want to do manual work and be at the mercy of rulers, the only employment open to him was in court service or brigandage. Apparently, there was one gang of brigands who specialized in robbing travellers as they crossed rivers. There they had to divide baggage and carry it across in boatloads; thieves pounced on the baggage at one end or the other and made away with what they could.
Warfare was a flourishing industry in eighteenth-century India; so the demand for soldiers was high, and all armies were overblown. When the British imposed their rule and pensioned off some rulers, they were hard put to support their hangers-on and make ends meet. The worst off was the Mogul King. It was the custom then that those who were taken for an audience with the King first had to give him a present; Lord Combermere gave him 100 gold mohurs (a mohur was worth a Pound and 12 shillings, or 16 silver rupees), and each of the Princes ten mohurs. Then Prince Meerza Salim took him to an anteroom and dressed him in clothes presented by the King – a coat was draped on top of his uniform, and a turban placed on his head. Then he was taken back to the King, who slung a sword on the General’s waist, and received another present. But the clothes Major Archer and his colleagues got were cheap, and he makes much fun of them.
The rulers who met with Major Archer’s admiration were Major Skinner and Begum Sumroo. They apparently managed their estates well and lived within their means; and their troops were better turned out – an important consideration for the ADC of the Commander-in-Chief, who inspected troops wherever he went. Another thing he noticed was the design and condition of the numerous fortresses; as soon as he saw one, Major Archer would instinctively size up how difficult it would be to take the fort. It depended on the height and thickness of the walls, but even more on the condition of the glacis – the open ground surrounding the fort. The larger the glacis and the less cluttered with encroachments, the better the view commanded by the defenders, and the more attackers they could pick off and shoot.
Most of the cities through which the party travelled were in a state of desolation; many houses were in ruin, and the population was much less than it must once have been. The wars and invasions of the eighteenth century caused much damage to the economy of upper India. The East India company deputed an engineer called Major Smith to repair the ramparts and city of Delhi. He lived in a Ty-kounah which must once have belonged to some nobleman. This was an underground mansion underneath the ramparts; it was well insulated and therefore was warm in winter and cool in summer.
Travellers at that time carried everything they needed: tents, cooking vessels, carpets, furniture, the lot. The likes of Lord Combermere had elephants to carry their baggage; camels and mules too were used. Officers rode on horses. Thus, a big man had a big caravan with him. It was fed by foraging the countryside. Apparently, there was a lot of wild life on the way. Major Archer thought nothing of going off into the wild and shooting a few birds for breakfast; antelopes and neelgays were also abundant. Once in a while the party heard of a tiger; often the tiger preyed on villagers and their cattle. Hunting tigers was an obligatory sport for the likes of Major Archer.

But not all the hunters of that time could have been young and athletic; so they had devised less demanding forms of hunting for the sedentary folk. They employed captive cheetahs. These cheetahs would be blindfolded and carried into the countryside on bullock carts. They would be let loose in the sight of deer, which they would chase and bring down. Villagers or courtiers beat an area for tigers and made them break out in the direction of the hunters, who would then loose a few fusillades at the fleeing tiger. Rulers staged fights between animals for the entertainment of guests – important guests like Combermere got to see a fight between an elephant and a tiger or leopard. They also saw a lot of nautch; the Nawaub of Oudh in particular had troupes of nautch girls at his command. But the nautch girls did not dance all the time; apparently they sang a lot. I suppose they were ghazals, although Major Archer was too ignorant and uninterested to know.