Saturday, December 12, 2015

OPEN ACCESS TO POWER TRANSMISSION

FROM BUSINESS WORLD OF 5 JANUARY 2007


Ultra mega prospects


The central government has traveled a long road to power reforms. It started in 1992 with the assurance of 16 per cent guaranteed returns to private investors. The guarantees were worthless, for the State Electricity Boards owed thousands of crores to coal companies and railways; unless they achieved solvency, they could hardly be expected to pay a guaranteed return. So in 2001, the Expert Group on the Restructuring of SEBs recommended conditional writing off of SEBs’ debts. State governments were delighted to get write-offs from SEBs’ creditors; but they had no intention of making the SEBs solvent. So the central government tried to force them. In the 2003 Electricity Act opened up access, which would have introduced unfettered competition in the power market. But it left it to state regulatory commissions to introduce open access. State governments know a trick of two, mostly learnt from the centre. They appointed regulatory commissions made up of pliant retired bureaucrats; through them the governments sabotaged open access. The commissions were supposed to set tariffs. But even if they asked state electricity boards to raise power tariffs, the boards just ignored their recommendations. In the absence of price reform, competition was a non-starter.
The UPA government decided that it was not worth while to force state governments to make SEBs solvent or introduce competition. But if they did neither, they would be unable to meet rising power demand. So the power ministry worked out a clever package: it would ensure that power was produced at the least cost, and offer it to SEBs at a fixed price. That is how the concept of Ultra Mega Projects came into being.
In this concept, the central government takes over all tasks involved in setting up a power station prior to building it. Thus, it secures a site, and obtains all the licences, permits and clearances required for 4-GW plants. It then calls for bids, and hands over the site to the bidder who offers to supply power at the lowest cost. The bidder’s job is to secure coal supplies, construct the plant and deliver 4 gigawatts of power into the central grid. Powergrid would deliver it to various SEBs in preannounced proportions; they would be expected to pay for it. This package has evoked a strongly positive response. The government has already signed contracts to build two plants, and is on the way to giving out three more. That is 20 gigawatts of power, and Rs 750 billion of investment.
The Ultra mega plants can realize their proceeds in three ways: through revolving letters of credit, escrow accounts, and failing both, by direct sales to high-tension consumers. But as long as distribution continues to be under the control of state governments, they can frustrate all three avenues of realization. Promising as it is, the new arrangement too will come to a halt if access to consumers remains in the hands of state electricity boards and they remain handmaidens of state governments.
Unless transmission and distribution are separated from state governments, it will be impossible to ensure that ultra mega projects will get the money for their power. There are two ways of ensuring this. One is embodied in the 2003 Act: state governments should separate T&D and hand it over to separate companies. But as long as the companies are under state governments’ control – whether they are owned or licensed by them – they will never be able to follow independent pricing policies.
However, there is another way. State governments continue to be short of money; therein may lie a possible way out. The central government already has a wholesale power transmission network in the Power Grid Corporation. Powergrid should offer to take over the transmission and distribution network in any state, deliver power to the final consumers and collect money. If state governments want to subsidize any particular consumers, it should offer to take the subsidy and give it to the intended beneficiaries. It should also be prepared to take over the T&D staff of the SEBs, but selectively and on its own terms. Privatization of T&D is a non-starter; but nationalization may just possibly work.

Whether it is separation or nationalization of T&D, the objective should not be lost sight of: it is open access, or competition. The central government has locked itself into one size – 4 gigawatts – and one technology – coal-fired plants. There are good reasons for this lock-in just now – it minimizes the demands on the government’s organizing capacity – but eventually, the T&D network should be open to all plants, large and small, based on all technologies, thermal, hydro, wind-based, or wave-powered. Each plant should find its own market; the task of the grid should be simply transport of power.

GIVE BANK LICENCES TO MUTUAL FUNDS

FROM BUSINESS WORLD OF 5 JANUARY 2007


Do not reward your banks


The budget season is also the season of supplication. Hundreds of poor old beggars write to the finance minister asking for favours. If they are small fry, they end up meeting a flunkey of the revenue department and leave a memorandum with him which is soon consigned to a dustbin. If they are important enough, the finance minister himself deigns to meet them.
Amongst the lucky ones are state-owned banks. Being the finance ministry’s own daughters they get a privileged hearing. The finance minister himself meets the heads of banks, and they have all the time to lay our their wish list before him.
This year they had some urgent requests. They want the finance minister to bring back Section 80L, under which interest on fixed deposits was exempt from tax up to Rs 12000, and to raise the limit to Rs 15000, and to exempt interest on savings accounts altogether.
P Chidambaram has been intent on removing tax rebates and exemptions and simplifying income tax law and administration. He repealed Section 80L to this end in 2005. How can the banks go to him and ask him to bring it back?
Their argument is that they are running short of cash, and that their capacity to lend is being constrained. The economy is experiencing a wonderful boom, and it is their patriotic duty to fuel it. To do so, they must have ample liquidity. To have the cash, they have to be able to retain deposits; tax exemptions will give them an advantage in the competition for deposits.
Who, then, is luring away the deposits from banks? Mutual funds. They offer a greater variety of investment outlets – debt, equity, long-term, short-term. And they do not have to comply with 2000 pages of Reserve Bank regulations; they do not have to open rural branches; nor have they to employ thousands like the banks. So the margins they charge are much narrower than banks’. If the latter earn margins of 4-7 per cent on their funds, mutual funds charge only 1-2 per cent.
But if the banks are being so patriotic by lending money, why did Reserve Bank raise the cash reserve ratio and reduce their ability to lend? It did so because it is worried about inflation and overheating of the economy. The banks hope that the finance ministry does not share Reserve Bank’s obsession with stability; they have some reason to hope that the finance minister is more optimistic and would like the boom to continue unrestrained.
Such a view can be legitimately held. After a long while India has got a beautiful boom with not a dark cloud on the horizon; it is perfectly respectable to wish that it would continue, and to help its continuation along.
But there is another, hidden agenda behind the banks’ ploy; they would like to get an advantage against their competitors, the mutual funds; and what better way than getting a tax concession for their customers only?
And that is precisely what is wrong about their request: that the finance ministry should not be favouring banks against their competitors – especially because it owns the banks. Taxation should be strictly neutral between different forms of financial investment. For instance, there is no justification for the tax rebate on long-term capital gains. Realized capital gains are income just like any other; as long as they are calculated after indexation of the original investment, they deserve to be taxed like any other income. The stock market would not like it, and may even stage a collapse to register its protest. Still, the discrimination is wrong – unless it is extended to all income from investments.
They are not doing so yet, but if banks were to argue that the restrictions on their business – that they can take only deposits of various tenures and use them only to finance loans – are unreasonable and cramp their ability to compete, there would be some truth in their complaint. And the remedy for that would be to remove the regulatory barrier between bank lending and investment in mutual funds. Banks should be able to offer their depositors the choice of investing in mutual funds.

But that freedom should be extended to mutual funds as well; they too should be allowed to take deposits, just like banks. It is time that Reserve Bank removed the embargo it has placed on new banking licences since 1994, and gave one to every mutual fund asset management company.

MUSLIMS, GO FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE

The other message


The report of the Sachar Committee is informative, meticulous and restrained. It has tested generally held prejudices and preconceptions about Muslims, and proved many to be wrong. It tells us graphically what it means to be a Muslim in India; even more, it tells us how it feels to be a Muslim. But it was not its purpose to tell us what it means to be someone who has all the Muslims’ characteristics without being a Muslim – in other words, how far the Muslims’ plight reflects the Indian society and how much of it is peculiar to Muslims. But it has given figures to answer these questions to some extent.
No community is homogeneous. We often refer to an average; but that average is a mean of disparate quantities. On average, Muslims in British India were better off. Partition left more Muslims with higher incomes in Pakistan and more Muslims with lower incomes in India – partly because West Pakistan was home of rich farmers, and partly because a larger proportion of rich Muslims – for instance, businessmen from Bombay and Gujarat – left for Pakistan. Partition did not impoverish Muslims; but it left more poor and fewer rich Muslims in India than in Pakistan.
A higher proportion of Muslims lives in towns than in villages. A higher proportion than in the general population are businessmen. These two factors should make them richer than average. A higher proportion of them are small businessmen and artisans; a higher proportion lives in the poor states of UP, Bihar and West Bengal; and a smaller proportion of Muslim women work. These three factors should make them poorer. My estimate is that higher urbanization would raise incomes by 6 per cent, and lower women’s work participation rate would lower them by 12 per cent. Muslims earn about the same as others in villages, and about 25 per cent less than others in cities – the bigger the city, the greater the difference. Their chances of being poor are 80 per cent higher than of the general population in towns as well as villages. I cannot quantify the effect of their being more in business and their being small businessmen. So I cannot work out what proportion of their disadvantage is not associated with factors that have nothing to do with their being Muslims. But whereas amongst Hindus, the poorest are labourers, a high proportion of them agricultural, the poorest amongst Muslims are self-employed craftsmen and peddlers – people living on the fringes of urban society.
From this I infer that the reasons for poverty are different amongst Hindus (amongst whom I include SC/STs) and Muslims. Amongst Hindus there is a large section in villages which has little or no land and which works on others’ farms for a pittance. It sees its way up in life in migrating to or working in towns, in occupations created by industrialization. Amongst Muslims there is a large section which lives by small-scale production or petty trade, whose livelihood is being eroded by modern industry and services. The deindustrialization in the last two centuries that historians talk about is still  continuing, and Muslims are its current victims. Development is an opportunity for Hindus and a threat for Muslims – not so much because of discrimination as of their location in traditional society.
I tried imperfectly to analyse the effects of economic factors on the incomes of Muslims above; for education, the Sachar Commission itself did a probit analysis. It does not give the results, but summarizes them as follows. Once Muslims get through secondary school, their chances of going on to graduation and post-graduation are no lower than for others. But the likelihood that they will go to school, and that once they do, they will complete the course, are much lower. In this respect Muslims did better than OBCs and SC/STs some decades ago; their relative performance has worsened. And education is the highway in our country to highly paid jobs as well as to modern business. This is the other factor behind Muslims’ poverty – they receive less education. (Incidentally, only 4 per cent of Muslim children go to Madrasas.)
I can think of three reasons why fewer Muslim children go to school or finish school. First, schooling is more difficult for them. Surprisingly, over a half of the Muslim children in Karnataka, Maharashtra and Andhra speak Urdu. All three states have thousands of Urdu-medium schools; but their results in school-leaving examinations are dismal. Obviously their quality is poor, and the prospects of their alumni must be equally poor. So even where Urdu schools are available, Muslim children would need to go to non-Urdu schools if they wanted a decent education. In UP and Bihar they do because Hindi is close to Urdu, and the number of Urdu schools is small. Elsewhere, a significant proportion of them may find education in the local language more difficult than for natives who speak it as a first language. Since they live amongst the natives, however, they cannot find the language too difficult; it is no worse than being educated in English, though the rewards may be more modest. Second, their families may follow occupations that do not require education, and may find their child labour too valuable to fritter away in schools. This factor is not peculiar to Muslims; child labour is ubiquitous amongst poor families of all religions – despite the present government’s ineffectual ban. But other communities are sending their children to school despite the opportunity cost; Muslims are doing so less.
That brings me to the third factor, Muslims may find the prospect of a better job as a result of education less attractive; in other words, there may be job discrimination. Is there? Muslims certainly think so; Sachar Commission received much verbal evidence to this effect. A smaller proportion of Muslim workers are “regular” salaried workers than for other communities – though that is because a high proportion of Muslims is self-employed. A smaller proportion is employed in large enterprises, government as well as private. A corollary is that fewer of them have a written contract or get social security benefits.
From this the government is likely to infer that Muslims are discriminated against in regular jobs, and to be tempted to reserve jobs for them. I think that would be a mistake based on misdiagnosis. The basic disadvantages of Muslims are specialization in declining industries, poor education and fluency in a language with no economic value. In my view, the government should put the money it spends on sending people on Haj into the modernization and diversification of the industries Muslims are specialized in – fabrics, leather, tobacco, auto repair and electricals. And Muslims should start writing Urdu in Devanagari script. Millions of Muslims in the north are going to Hindi schools anyway; they should actively hybridize Hindi and convert Hindi speakers to Hindustani. They would be thereby be doing a favour to the Hindi speakers.

But if they want to do themselves a favour, they should go straight over to English. Minority Muslim English medium schools, if well run, will attract students from all communities. That should be the next industry for Muslims to go into.

WHY COMPANIES ARE LEAVING INDIA

FROM THE TELEGRAPH OF 5 DECEMBER 2006


Flight is right


The late Milton Friedman believed that government functions should be pushed down to the lowest feasible level – to the municipality where possible, and to the states if that was not possible. National governments should be concerned with little beyond external relations, defence and justice. His reason was that the smaller the unit that enforced any laws, the more easily could a citizen who did not like them migrate to another unit with laws more to his liking.
This principle – the principle of subsidiarity – is enshrined in the rules that govern the European Union (EU). Not only do its member states keep laws they had before joining, but they also retain their parliaments, courts of justice and the power to enact and amend laws. The EU has no king and no Prime Minister. It has a President; but he is merely the chairman of a committee on which some (not all) member states are represented; and the Presidentship is rotated every six months. (The EU has so many members that even with each President occupying the chair only six months, it is many years before Presidentship comes by rotation to a country – a case of Presidential musical chairs.) It has a European Parliament in Stuttgart, which however it does little business; its membership is a sinecure that the parties of member states award to worthy senior members whom they do not wish to see for some time.
But the EU would not be EU if it did not have a government; and all governments abhor a power vacuum. In the absence of a political apex, the secretariat – the European Commission in Brussels – usurps political functions. It is large, since all member countries must have a share in it. It does not make laws, but comes pretty close. It lays down principles that follow from the treaties that created the EU, and shoots off letters to member governments suggesting either that those principles should be embodied into members’ laws or that the laws should be brought into conformity with the principles. The EU does not legislate; but it strives diligently to harmonize member countries’ laws in the direction of a uniform law. It does not quite dictate the wording; and the body of laws is so large that it would be decades before the Commission could bring a modicum of uniformity in them. But it can and does take up topical areas of law and push harmonization in those; it comes close to persuading countries to have laws that are similar in substantial respects. This is particularly true of new areas not cluttered up with old laws – for instance, telecommunications.
How far does the principle of subsidiarity survive in the face of this pressure for harmonization? The Commission does sometimes ask countries to amend some or other legislation. Still, much variety in national laws can persist provided they do not overtly conflict; and even conflicts can be accommodated as long as the citizens of each country are satisfied with its laws. The only mechanism that works towards uniformity is the judiciary. It may happen that a citizen is dissatisfied with the verdict of the highest court in hiscountry. If he finds that judges or laws in another member country disagree with the verdict, he can go to the European Court of Justice and ask it to say who is right.
The processes of harmonization are so dilatory that considerable variety persists between national laws. To this extent, a European has the choice of many judicial and legal systems. But in fact, few Europeans choose to migrate to another country because of its laws. People migrate to France because it has an abundance of cheap property in beautiful villages or to Amsterdam because of the ease of getting drugs there. Many Poles have moved to England to do plumbing or electrical jobs natives are too lazy to do; but their migration has nothing to do with a difference in laws.
But Indian companies have been shopping for jurisdiction. To curry favour with Indian depositors, Reserve Bank keeps up banks’ deposit interest rates. Government-owned banks account for three-quarters of banking business in India. They employ many more people than they need, so their costs are high. So Reserve Bank allows them to lend at high rates. Indian companies naturally prefer to borrow abroad where it costs less. Since we are hoping to be a global power, Reserve Bank can hardly stop them completely. But it does the next worst thing – it rations what it calls External Commercial Borrowings. Similarly, it cannot stop them completely from raising equity abroad. Instead, it puts restrictions on the circumstances in which they can raise it, the uses they can put it to, how long they can keep it abroad and so on.
If Reserve Bank has a ball restricting business, Securities and Exchange Board of India can hardly let itself be left behind. So it rations public issues: very little for rich investors, a half for Qualified Institutional Investors (QIIs) whom it can control, and a big chunk for fictitious “retail” investors. They are a category it has created. Anybody can be a retail investor. But issuing companies cannot allot him more than a small number of shares. The issue price is negotiated between the issuing company and QIIs, who use their bargaining power to ensure that the company sells them shares at a price well below the eventual market price. A side result is that retail investors also make windfall gains on shares they manage to get. No wonder they want more shares they can get, and make many applications. The chances of being caught are small if one is clever. But Sebi has caught a few, and banned them from applying for more shares. Worse, it has imposed enormous fines on their depository participants (DPs) and brokers. Now they will be expected to make sure that their clients are real “retail investors” and have not made multiple applications. It is physically impossible to do so; “retail investors” will continue to make multiple applications, Sebi will catch some once in a while, and milk their DPs and brokers. Nice business. DPs and brokers will lose some money; but enormously more will be lost by issuing companies, whose issues will be underpriced.

But as I said, they cannot go and raise equity abroad; Reserve Bank will stop them. So what will they do? They will set up companies abroad in jurisdictions that have less stupid and intrusive regulators. We have seen a spate of Indian companies buying or setting up companies abroad; London and New York have been their favourite haunts. Their exploits have led to much self-congratulation amongst patriotic Indians; they exult at this demonstration of India’s burgeoning economic might. Might is right. But flight is equally important. We were always good at keeping foreign companies out of India; now we are getting good at chasing Indian companies out of India. The consequence in both cases is less employment and production on Indian soil. But with the economy growing at 9 per cent a year, who cares? Even in a globalized economy, the government has to have something to do – whatever the cost to the country.

RUN A REVENUE SURPLUS

FROM THE TELEGRAPH OF 4 DECEMBER 2006


The next great reform


There are reformers in this world, and there are those who enjoy the fruits of reforms; seldom do the two coincide. India is one of those exceptional countries. Manmohan Singh and P Chidambaram implemented the reforms in the early 1990s; today they are at the helm again. It is even more unusual because they did not immediately inherit the fruits of their reforms. Both were in the wilderness for years; it then looked as if their path-breaking policies had only benefited their political opponents, who had done nothing to deserve the fruits. So there is poetic justice in their return to power at the peak of the golden boom that reformed India is enjoying.
It is therefore not surprising that they feel rather elated and tend to rest on their oars; they deserve it. And it is understandable that when they think of what to do next, their ideas fall somewhat short of their best. If Chidambaram thinks of tripling loans to farmers, Manmohan Singh thinks of jobs for Muslims. If Chidambaram proposes tax cuts, Manmohan Singh proposes capital account convertibility. Chidambaram does not recognize that so called bank loans to agriculture already represent a substantial proportion of agricultural credit, but that they go largely to big farmers who do many things besides farming, and use those loans for many other purposes. Manmohan Singh does not betray knowledge of the fact that the low proportion of Muslims in prized jobs has much to do with the smaller proportion of them acquiring education that is the gateway to those jobs, and indeed to fewer of them finishing school at all. Chidambaram wants to reduce taxes even though no one is complaining of high taxes, and has not considered what other uses the tax revenue he wants to forgo might be put to. Manmohan Singh does not say why he wants capital account convertibility – because Indian savers can then invest globally, or because foreign capital inflows would increase, or because cost of capital to Indian businesses would come down. If he did, he would see that all these potential benefits are uncertain, conditional and not necessarily large. At one time, a Japanese friend taught me Go. He used to beat me in every game. After every win he would tell me, “Don’t make weak moves.” It is difficult to avoid the impression that the reformers of yore are making consistently weak moves.
I believe something better is now within the government’s reach: a revenue surplus. However desirable it might have been, it was unthinkable till now. The deficit was too large, and demands of spending ministries were too strident. But because of the ongoing boom, central revenue is rising at an extraordinary rate. Even if Chidambaram did nothing, the revenue deficit would come down. If he put a slight brake on government expenditure, it would be possible to abolish the revenue deficit in two years, and from then on to run a surplus. Instead of forcing banks to hold a high proportion of their assets in government securities, it would then be possible to retire or buy off government debt from them. And the more the debt contracts, the greater will be the funds that banks can lend to businesses. Retirement of debt will bring down the share of interest payments, currently 60 per cent of government expenditure, and will enable the government to spend more on infrastructure.
A revenue surplus, being deflationary, will lead to an improvement in the current account. A stronger balance of payments will give Reserve Bank the choice of either accumulating foreign exchange reserves even faster, or of appreciating the Rupee. As we have experienced in the past four years, reserve accumulation leads to a rise in money supply, greater liquidity, lower interest rates, higher business profits and greater industrial investment. Appreciation of the Rupee would reduce the price of imports, bring down inflation and intensify competition in the domestic market. Real production and incomes would rise faster once the economy got through the initial deflationary impact – which in current conditions of buoyancy would a good thing anyway.
One possible danger to our long-term growth has been the current account deficit; if foreign capital inflows stopped today, foreign exchange reserves would decline. That would reduce money supply, raise interest rates and reduce the growth rate. If reserves fell beyond a certain point, Reserve Bank would panic, push up interest rates even further and deflate the economy. This danger can be avoided if a sufficient revenue surplus is achieved to rectify the payments deficit. All countries (other than the US) that grew rapidly over long periods had a current account surplus; if India achieves one, its growth would be much less vulnerable. A payments surplus does not preclude net capital inflows. China has a huge current account surplus and still receives large capital inflows. It chooses to accumulate reserves; we could choose any combination of reserve accumulation, exchange rate appreciation and import liberalization.
Those are the real effects of a revenue surplus. In addition there will be a monetary effect. As the supply of government securities declines, a higher proportion of the rise in banks’ deposits will become available for financing productive investment. The government has no budget constraint, and can afford to borrow at any interest rate. Government borrowings define a floor to interest rates. When the revenue budget goes into surplus, government borrowings will become negative; the government will begin to buy off debt from banks and other institutions and retire it. Its borrowings will no longer place a floor under interest rates; interest rates can then fall to any level. A reduction in interest rates will lead to a rise in demand for all the expensive goods that are generally bought with borrowed funds – plant and machinery, and land and buildings. It will lead to a rise in investment, and hence in the growth rate of the economy.
The past three years have seen a fall in the government’s savings deficit, and a simultaneous rise in the domestic savings and investment ratios. Improvement of the revenue balance will have the same effect; and as domestic savings and investment increase, the growth rate also will rise.
Thus, achievement of a revenue surplus is the strongest growth-stimulating measure the government can take. From 8-9 per cent, it could push up growth to 10 per cent and above by spending less. If India is serious about catching up with China’s breathtaking growth, this is the most promising step the government can take towards that goal.

The fact that India has accelerated its growth despite high fiscal deficits has created the belief that fiscal balance does not affect growth – a belief that can be supported by running regressions on annual data. But such regressions exclude many other influences on growth as well as lagged effects, and are therefore unreliable. The macroeconomic effects of an improvement in fiscal balance are easy to work out in any model, and will give the same results in all – that it raises the growth rate. Now our celebrated reformers have a chance to see this work out in practice. It is an experiment they cannot afford to miss.